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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 
3 and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the 
immunity provision of Rule XVI of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar precludes this action 
against defendant/appellee Utah State Bar ("Bar") either 
because it provides immunity to the Bar or because the 
immunity it provides to all Bar disciplinary personnel 
eliminates the basis of any action against the Bar. 
III. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing the district court's order granting 
the Bar's motion to dismiss, this Court should construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs/appellees Ernest L. antf Sharon S. Bailey 
("Baileys") and indulge all reasonable influences in its 
favor. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zioris First National Bank, 
767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). In so doing, the Court need 
not, however, accept extrinsic facts not pleaded, Allred v. 
Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1979). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action against the Bar seeking damages 
resulting from the Bar's alleged failure "to protect 
[Baileys] from the known negligent behavior of an attorney 
known to have engaged in !a pattern of misconduct including 
negligence and incompetence'n (verified complaint, para. 28 
at R. p. 8). Baileys also seek a writ of mandamus to compel 
the Bar to take appropriate disciplinary action against J. 
Richard Calder and to proceed on claims against the client 
security fund. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
In response to Baileys' verified complaint, the Bar 
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, granted the Bar's motion and 
entered an order of dismissal on February 28, 1990. 
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C. Disposition in the Court Below 
The lower court granted the Bar's Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss and entered an order of dismissal on 
February 28f 1990. 
D. Statement of Facts 
On December 15f 1987, Baileys filed their verified 
complaint against the Bar initiating the present action. In 
their verified complaint, Baileys allege that on March 21, 
1978 they hired J. Richard Calder (Calder) to handle their 
bankruptcy case (verified complaint, para. 8 at R. p. 5). 
Calder allegedly omitted certain creditors from Baileys1 
list of creditors resulting in plaintiff Ernest L. Bailey's 
inability to obtain a chauffeur's license and consequently 
the loss of two jobs (verified complaint, paras. 8-10 at R. 
p. 5) The verified complaint further alleges that from 
March, 1979 until August, 1983, the Baileys made attempts to 
have Calder rectify his mistake (verified complaint, para. 
10 at R. p. 5). Baileys allege in their complaint that they 
dis-covered in December of 1986 that the Bar knew of 
Calderfs pattern of incompetence and that the Utah State Bar 
Ethics Committee had filed a complaint with the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar on June 17, 1983 
(verified complaint, paras. 12 and 25 at R. pps. 4 and 6). 
Under the heading "Cause of Action", Baileys' verified 
complaint then alleges as follows: 
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Defendant, having the responsibility 
to regulate the conduct of 
attorneys, breached a fiduciary duty 
to the public in general, and to the 
plaintiff, in particular, to protect 
him from the known negligent 
behavior of an attorney known to 
have engaged in a "pattern of 
misconduct including negligence and 
incompetence •" 
Because of the negligent conduct of 
Plaintiff's former attorney, J. 
Richard Calder (who was allowed to 
practice law through Defendants 
negligence) Plaintiff, Ernest L. 
Bailey, was denied a livelihood in 
his chosen profession and denies 
[sic] competent representation in a 
bankruptcy Court, 
In their demand for relief, the Baileys seek 
damages "for failure to protect Plaintiffs from a negligent 
attorney who provided incompetent representation...." Their 
demand for relief also requests a "writ of mandamus to 
compel the Utah State Bar to take appropriate disciplinary 
action against attorney, J. Richard Calder...." 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar should be read broadly enough to extend 
immunity to the Utah State Bar. Even if the Bar itself does 
not have immunity under that provision, the immunity granted 
to all Bar disciplinary personnel removes the basis for 
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Baileys1 action against the Bar, Furthermore/ even if 
Baileys' verified complaint is construed not to relate to 
disciplinary proceedings/ it does npt state a valid claim 
against the Bar. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
In response to the Baileys' verified complaint, the 
Bar filed a motion to dismiss premised on Rule XVI(a) of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar which grants 
all disciplinary personnel of the Utah State Bar absolute 
immunity from civil suit or liability for conduct in the 
course of their official responsibilities. The Bar argued 
that that provision extends immunity to the Bar and that, 
even if it does not, the immunity granted to Bar 
disciplinary personnel shields the Bar from liability. The 
district court adopted the Bar's argument and granted its 
motion to dismiss. The sole issue before this Court is 
whether the district court properly granted the Bar's motion 
to dismiss. 
Rule XVI(a) of the Procedures of Discipline of the 
Utah State Bar provides as follows: 
Disciplinary Personnel Immune from 
Civil Suit. All members of the 
Committee, Board, hearing commit-
tees, Bar Counsel, disciplinary 
staff and other persons duly 
authorized to act in disciplinary 
proceedings under these rules shall 
absolutely immune from civil suit or 
liability for any conduct in the 
course of their official responsi-
bilities. 
Although this rule does not specifically name the Bar, the 
intent of the provision was to provide a broad immunity to 
allow the Bar through its disciplinary personnel to conduct 
disciplinary proceedings without the threat of incurring 
civil liability. That immunity provision should be 
construed broadly enough to extend immunity to the Bar. 
Even if Rule XVI (a) does not explicitly extend 
immunity to the Bar, the immunity it provides to all Bar 
disciplinary personnel shields the Bar from liability. The 
Bar is an organization which, similar to a corporation, acts 
through designated representatives. As to disciplinary 
matters, the Bar acts through individuals serving in various 
capacities: On the Ethics and Discipline Committee, on the 
Board of Commissioners, on hearing committees, as Bar 
Counsel, and Bar Counsel staff, and in other capacities 
related to disciplinary matters. Any tort liability the Bar 
incurs is through the acts of the Bar's representatives. 
Since those involved in the disciplinary process are immune 
from suit and liability, the basis upon which the Bar's 
liability rests is removed and the Bar cannot be held 
liable. 
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This conclusion is supported by the case of 
Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625, (Utah 
1972). In that case, this Court considered a master's 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior when the 
liability of the servant had been eliminated. The Court 
stated as follows: 
Under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, the liability of the 
master to a third person for 
injuries inflicted by a servant...is 
derivative and secondary.... [T]he 
exoneration of the servant removes 
the foundation upon which to impute 
negligence to the master. 
Id. at p. 627. 
This case is consistent with the general principle 
stated at 53 Am.Jur.2d Master & Servant §406 as follows: 
In a case where the employer's 
liability depends solely upon the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, 
recovery cannot be had against an 
employer for damages resulting from 
the alleged wrongful or negligent 
act of the employeev after the 
employee has been discharged from 
personal liability.... This is not 
upon the theory that the employer is 
denied the right to recover over 
against the employee, but upon the 
ground that the sole basis of 
liability is -he negligence or 
wrongdoing of the employee imputed 
to the employer under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior; the 
acquittal of the employee of 
wrongdoing conclusively negatives 
liability of the employer. 
_ " 7 _ 
See also Vaughn v. Texaco, Inc., 631 P.2d 1334, 1337 
(Ok. Ct.App. 1981) ("It is a well settled rule of law that 
where a plaintiff's cause of action is predicated on the 
alleged acts of negligence by an employee (agent) which in 
turn is attributable to the employer (principal) under the 
rule of respondeat superior, and the employee (agent) is 
exonerated from blame, the employer (principal) is likewise 
exonerated.") and Nyman v. MacRae Bros. Const. Co., 418 P.2d 
253, 254 (Wa. 1966) ("There can be no liability as a master 
unless the servant is liable.") 
Under the immunity provision of Rule XVI of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, all 
individuals whose negligence or fault could be imputed to 
the Bar are immune. The basis upon which Baileys claim 
recovery against the Bar is eliminated. The district 
court's dismissal of Baileys' verified complaint was proper 
and should be affirmed by this Court. 
In light of the foregoing, Baileys argue that their 
complaint does not state a claim relating to a disciplinary 
proceeding and that the Bar's argument based on Rule XVI 
does not apply. Baileys' argument is inconsistent with the 
language of their verified complaint. 
As they acknowledge in their brief, Baileys' 
verified complaint alleges "that the State Bar failed in its 
duty to both the public and the Baileys to protect them from 
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known pattern of negligence and incompetence by a member of 
the State Bar" (Brief of Appellant, p. 16). Baileys allege 
that Calder "was allowed to practice law through Defendant's 
negligence" (verified complaint, para. 29 at R. p. 8). In 
their demand for relief, Baileys seek a judgment for damages 
"for failure to protect Plaintiffs frpm a negligent attorney 
who provided incompetent representation in Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts" (verified complaint, p. 7 at R. p. 8) and 
seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Bar to "take 
appropriate disciplinary actions against.. .Calder" (verified 
complaint, p. 8 at R. p. 9). 
Baileys claim the Bar should have done something 
"to protect them from a known pattern of negligence and 
incompetence by" Calder. Such language can mean only that 
Baileys claim that the Bar should have taken some 
disciplinary action against Calder. As indicated above, 
however, the Bar is shielded from liability either directly 
through the immunity provision of Rul^ XVI of the Procedures 
_ Q _ 
of Discipline of the Utah State Bar or indirectly through 
the immunity granted to all Bar disciplinary personnel.* 
Even if Baileys' verified complaint is construed 
not to state a claim relating to a disciplinary proceeding, 
it does not state a proper claim. In arguing that their 
complaint does not state a claim relating to a disciplinary 
proceeding, Baileys seem to argue in their brief that their 
complaint sets forth two separate claims which are 
unaffected by the immunity provision of Rule XVI. The two 
claims which the Baileys appear to argue their complaint 
makes are (1 ) that the Bar failed to disclose to them that 
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings and (2) 
that the Baileys received bad advice from Bar Counsel. 
Neither of these claims has any merit. 
To hold the Bar liable for failure to disclose that 
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings, Baileys 
*Baileys' allegation that the Bar should have taken some 
action to prevent Calder from practicing law is without 
merit for another reason. The Bar itself cannot take 
any action which would prevent an attorney from 
practicing law. The Bar may only recommend to this 
Court that an attorney be suspended or disbarred. Any 
action to suspend or disbar an attorney is exclusively 
within this Court's prerogative. See Rule VII of the 
Procedures of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. 
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must first show that the Bar had some duty to disclose that 
information to them. The Bar, however, has no duty to 
disclose that an attorney is the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings. Indeed, the Bar is compelled not to disclose 
that information pursuant to Rule VI(a) of the Procedures of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar which provides as follows: 
All disciplinary proceedings 
conducted by Bar Counsel before the 
Ethics and Discipline Committee or 
its panels shall be confidential and 
shall not be a matter of public 
record except as appropriate or 
necessary to allege and prove 
private reprimands or private 
admonitions under Rule VIII(h) in 
the case of waiver or where 
affirmative defenses place 
disciplinary proceedings in issue. 
The pendency, subject matter and 
status of an investigation or 
complaint may be disclo$ed, however, 
if: 
( 1 ) The member of the Bar under 
investigation has waived 
confidentiality; 
(2) The disciplinary proceeding is 
based upon the conviction of a 
crime; 
(3) The disciplinary proceeding is 
based upon allegations that have 
become generally known to the 
public. 
The Bar had no duty to disclose to Baileys that 
Calder was the subject of disciplinary proceedings. Indeed, 
the Bar was under an obligation not to disclose that 
information. If Baileys1 verified complaint is construed to 
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allege that the Bar should have disclosed that Calder was 
the subject of disciplinary proceedings, the complaint is 
without merit. 
Baileys also appear to argue that their complaint 
states a claim that they received bad advice from Bar 
Counsel regarding Calder. Baileys argue in their brief that 
the Bar "should be held to the same standard of care as any 
other lawyer in the community" (Brief of Appellant, p. 
17). The verified complaint, however, contains no 
allegation that an attorney-client relationship was 
established between Bar Counsel and the Baileys. The only 
"advice" Bar Counsel gave to the Baileys was that they take 
advantage of an offer from Calder to "get this [bankruptcy] 
matter settled once and for all" upon payment of $10.00 and 
later that they contact Calder to have him proceed on the 
bankruptcy matter he was handling for them and to complete 
the matter upon payment of $15.00 (verified complaint, para. 
14 and 18 at R. p. 6). 
Bar Counsel and the Bar had no relationship with 
the Baileys which would give rise to a duty to give certain 
advice. No duty could possibly have been breached by 
advising Baileys to return to the attorney who was handling 
their bankruptcy matter to have him pursue it to completion. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/appellee Utah 
State Bar respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
district court's order dismissing Baileys' verified 
complaint. 
DATED this 6th day of August, iy90. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
x
 o 
(JffliTOiPP 
ROBERT H. REES 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees Utah State Bar 
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